Masakata Ogawa
Faculty of Education
Ibaraki University
Mito, Ibaraki 310-8512
JAPAN
E-mail: ogawam@mito.ipc.ibaraki.ac.jp
Introduction
Researchers in science education have held several positions toward the relation between science and culture. An earlier stance saw traditional culture as a barrier of science teaching and learning (for example, Wilson, 1981). This research has uncovered various kinds of cultural factors that inhibit an effective learning of science; factors such as: indigenous worldviews, language, customs, and human relationships. The most common concern among these science educators is how to eliminate such negative factors from science teaching/learning settings.
In another category of research, science educators have been interested in alternative knowledge systems that explain our world, especially knowledge systems found in certain traditional cultures. In this category, traditional worldviews or knowledge systems on natural phenomena are usually regarded as a comparable with those of Western science. Science educators in this group do not hesitate to respect such alternative knowledge systems, and they sometimes include such knowledge systems in their science classes. One example is the recent interest in Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) in the context of science education (Snively, 1995).
A third category of research addresses the contribution of various cultures to Western science. In the developmental process of Western science, ideas from various cultures (Chinese, Islamic, African and so on) have been taken up by science. In addition, many scientists and engineers from various cultures contribute to contemporary science and technological research fields. The multicultural science education movement (for example, Atwater and Riley, 1993; Reiss, 1993) may fit this category. Committed science educators develop teaching materials comprised of many episodes describing such contributions (for example, Addison-Wesley, 1993). This stance is popular among recent official science standards in several countries.
However, there are not as many science educators whose interest lies in the 'culturality' of science itself. In this last category of research, science is regarded as a kind of culture. The cultural aspects of science become one major focus in classrooms. For example, Ogawa (1986) proposes that Western science be viewed as a foreign culture to non-westerners. Aikenhead (1996, 1997) adopts the idea of 'cultural border crossing,' in which science culture is identified as one of the subcultures within Western culture, and thus called subculture science.
This short essay is based on this last category of research. It first
examines the culturality of science, focusing on 'science as the culture
of scientific community.' Next, it uncovers the nature of 'scientism' that
accompanies science culture and that is found in science education documents.
Lastly, this essay discusses how one might cope with scientism when teaching
science.
Science in a Multiscience Perspective
What is science when we refer to science education? This question may be curious for conventional science educators, because for them science is science. However, I think that this question is the very beginning of a new perspective for science education. When I started my thinking of 'science in science education' issue as a Japanese science educator, my fundamental presupposition on 'science' has been 'science as a foreign culture for the Japanese' (Ogawa, 1986). Science, which can be usually mentioned as Western science, was not Japanese original but an imported one from western world during mid 19th century. Despite of this fact, why could the Japanese learn science? While I have been struggling with this question, it has given me fruitful ideas on how science education should be. And recently I proposed the idea, 'science education in multiscience perspective' (Ogawa, 1995b) through such struggle. Let me begin with summarizing it briefly.
Ogawa (1995b) adopts a rather broader definition of science; that is, 'a rational perceiving of reality' where 'perceiving' means both 'the action constructing reality and construct of reality' (p.588). Caution should be taken that the 'rationality' in this context never means Western modern rationality alone. If 'rational' is the correct term for behavior in accordance with rules, there can be a kind of rationality in each culture. Then he distinguishes three types of 'science.'
The first type, 'indigenous science' is defined as 'a culture-dependent collective rational perceiving of reality', where 'collective' means held in sufficiently similar form by many persons to allow effective communication, but independent of any particular mind or set of minds (p.588). It is the science in a certain culture. This comes, for example, from Yamada's (1970) view, 'every society and culture has its own science, and its function is sustaining its mother society and culture.' Indigenous science is held by a specific cultural group, not by a specific individual. Indigenous science may be of a nature such that even individuals living in that culture may neither recognize its existence nor be aware of being governed by it tacitly. Also, indigenous science might be tacitly transferred from generation to generation through daily social and cultural events. An individual cannot express indigenous science as a kind of specific theoretical system. Rather, indigenous science is, so to speak, only collectively lived in and collectively experienced by the people of that culture (pp.585-586).
The second type, 'personal science' is the science at the personal level and defined as 'a rational perceiving of reality, which is unique to each individual' (p.588).
The last type of science is Western modern science, which is defined as 'a collective rational perceiving of reality, which is shared and authorized by the scientific community' (p.589). Western modern science is justified only by the scientific community itself. All other institutions have been excluded from the 'inquisition' of scientific justification, and are expected to accept it without objections or doubts. While the former two types of science pertain to the every-day-life world, characterized by a human vitality and purpose found in the descriptions and explanations of what scientists called natural phenomena, Western modern science pertains to a Cartesian materialistic world in which humans are seen in reductionistic and mechanistic terms (p.589). While indigenous science and personal science treat the everyday-life world, Western modern science treats the scientists' theoretical world. Thus, we science educators are just in the multiscience setting.
Definition of science as 'a rational perceiving of reality' seems to
be acceptable by a certain group of science educators (Aikenhead and Huntley,
1997). This kind of treatment is one of the very beginnings of relief from
our fixed idea on science held for a long time without any doubt on its
legitimacy.
Science as the Culture of Scientific Community
The above discussion also shows us another interesting viewpoint. If 'western modern science' is defined as 'a collective rational perceiving of reality, which is shared and authorized by the scientific community,' 'western modern science' can be regarded as the science of a specific professionals named scientists. Or, in fact, we can say that what I call 'western modern science' is the Culture of Scientific Community. I would like to do emphasis on the very nature of 'scientists' culture' in this essay.
Is it ever possible to use the term, 'culture' in this case? For example, an cultural anthropologist Keesing (1976), in his textbook, uses 'culture' to 'refer to systems of shared ideas, to the conceptual designs, the shared systems of meaning, that underlie the ways in which a people live.' (p.139) In this definition, if we can change the phrase, 'the ways in which a people live' into 'the ways in which a people named scientist work,' we will obtain an interesting definition of science-as-culture. That is, 'science' refers to 'systems of shared ideas, to the conceptual designs, the shared systems of meaning, that underlie the ways in which a people named scientist work.' I do not feel any problem on this definition of 'science,' in considering what I have been calling 'western modern science.'
Once we accept the usage of 'science as the culture of scientific community,' we can describe it more in detail. 'Western modern science' is a total body of specific ways of recognizing the world and its resultant image of the world, which is held by, maintained by, developed by the group of people, who, regardless of their gender and/or socio-cultural origin, works as a social function called 'scientist,' (Ogawa, 1995a) and at the same time, it is only the group that guarantees legitimacy of 'western modern science.'
An important point is that scientist is one of the professionals in our contemporary society. This immediately implies two things. One is that every scientist does not belong to the same specific indigenous culture world (Indigenous Science, in my usage of multiscience perspective), because not only western peoples but also non-western peoples serve as professional scientists. The other is that scientists in our contemporary society are one of the jobs, and therefore, they do not always think, act, behave, and live as 'scientists' in their daily lives. While they, in principle, live in their respective indigenous culture world just as their family members or neighborhood do, they go into the western modern science world as a specific professional named scientist. In this sense, I am doubting the usage, 'western' modern science. We need not to add the adjective 'western' when referring to modern science, though I realize that the ways of knowing in and the origin of modern science are heavily dependent upon western culture. On the contrary, if we call it simply 'modern science,' then the issue what is the indigenous science for westerners seems to be more realistic and of worth reexamining.
One of the major characteristics of the culture named modern science seems to be its perfect 'closedness' within the group members. This is a very different kind of 'closedness' of science, when compared with the view on 'closedness vs openness' shown in Robin Horton's memorable papers (1967). His major finding of the very difference between African traditional thought and western science was the scheme, 'closedness of traditional thought' vs 'openness of scientifically oriented cultures.' The 'closedness of traditional thought' is derived from the nature that it rejects alternatives of ways of thinking, while 'openness of scientifically oriented cultures' is identified from the fact that it allows possible alternatives of theories or concepts. This discussion is limited within thought systems.
However, there is another aspect; actors in science. Deliberation leads us to ask who can allow to propose such alternatives? They are scientists alone. Non-scientists can neither take part in the endeavor of revision of modern science theories or concepts, nor in the process of 'inquisition.' Scientists always insist that modern science is open to anybody, modern science theories are open to any kinds of criticism, and open to the claim of revision. Furthermore, general public also believe that such view is correct. However, I think it is an illusion. Only those who declare that they obey any rules, customs, norms or cultural code of scientific community, that is, scientists, can receive the right to make claims to the discourses in modern science. Or, in reverse, if you want to join such activities, you should declare to respect and obey the cultural code of scientific community before doing so. This means that the fundamental base on which scientific community stands is never attacked or out of debate. Thus, I cannot but think that it is the superficial openness of scientific community. 'Science-as-culture' may be one of the most closed cultures in the world, and is never open to everybody. Why can such closed culture be learned by everybody?
Scientists believe in the deed (scientific activities) they are involved
in, and the products (science theories and concepts) they have made up,
because they believe that they are pursuing the truth. Also they are unaware
of their own value system and they unconsciously force general public to
accept their own value system as the true value system, but it is clear
that this value system, just as others, is valid only within scientific
community. Of course, I do respect the beliefs of scientific community,
but do at the same time have some doubts on the position that such beliefs
should be involved in science education programs for general public in
various cultural settings. Probably, this issue will be one of the most
critical ones, but in most cases it is missing when considering the foundations
of science education. In the next section I will discuss the issue from
the viewpoint of scientism.
Scientism embedded in Scientific Community
'Scientism' is a popular term among certain science educators, but consensus on the definition is illusive. For example, Cobern (1994, p.585) writes, 'Though recognizing the tentative nature of all scientific knowledge, scientism imbues scientific knowledge with a Laplacian certainty denied all other disciplines, thus giving science an a priori status in the intellectual world.' Also, John Ziman (1980) writes as follows:
It (Scientism) reinforces, without question or comment, the widespread sentiment that science should be the only authority for belief and the only criterion for action..... The trouble with scientism is that it takes as given an attitude 'for' science, without deeper analysis. This attitude provokes naive forms of antiscientism which are equally sterile. The very questions that are to be answered in the attempt to formulate satisfactory opinions about the role, value, use, etc., of science have already been begged. (p.33)
Habermas (1974) uses a rather simple definition of scientism: 'science's belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science' (p.4). Here, I also define scientism as 'an ideology that identifies valid knowledge only with science.'
Scientism in this sense comes out as its most visible forms of (1) unconditional belief in science and (2) uncritical confidence of valuing application of science into life-world settings. Here, I would like to discuss briefly on the nature of these two points.
(1) Unconditional Belief in Science
I have proposed the need to distinguish 'understanding science' from 'believing in science' (Ogawa, 1997b). A belief in science, scientific attitudes, and scientific ways of thinking is, I think, deeply rooted in western value system, which is well shared among Western traditional cultures. And it is well shared among many western science educators as well as scientists, I suppose. Thus, Ogawa (1997b) argues:
We can be allowed to have an option to take a stance that 'I can understand what western modern science world really is, but cannot believe in it !!' My position is that whether one can believe in science and scientific worldview or not should be determined, not by the value within western modern science, but by the value within the daily life world of the people concerned. (p.9)
Findings in science studies (for example, Richards, 1983; Duschl,1994) clearly indicate that science is a kind of human endeavor among other endeavors, and thus the discourses in science are not the absolute truth but relative to other endeavors than science. The scientific worldview is one kind of worldview, which is commonly produced and held by the workers named 'scientists.' Believing in science or a scientific worldview as the only one true worldview is an ideology that I call 'scientism', which is mainly held and authorized by scientists and most of science educators, and they unconsciously forces general public in any cultural settings to accept and share it.
The world of modern science is, so to speak, a world seen through a kind of eyeglasses (see Hanson, 1969), or a kind of 'representation' of the world. Note that never is it reality itself, nor does modern science command us to wear it. The decision whether or not one believes in the truthfulness of modern science as if it were reality itself or she/he even wants to alter reality by applying the theories or laws embedded in modern science to it, is left to her/himself.
Considering science education, you may ask; 'Is it possible to understand modern science without believing in its truthfulness?' I would like to answer to it by saying 'Yes'. Understanding modern science as the culture of scientists is, in principle, open to every one, but believing in its truthfulness must be a rather value-laden or culture-dependent action for everyone. Even scientists can, in principle, understand, work in, and contribute to modern science without believing in the truthfulness of modern science. This is one reason why non-westerners can be scientists without losing their identity. While I admit in certain socio-cultural settings 'belief in science' be accepted and shared in their community, I would argue that 'belief in science' should not be forced to 'all' people with different value systems in science education setting. Responsibility of science educators in respective socio-cultural contexts is quite crucial in this very point.
(2) Uncritical Conviction of Valuing Application of Science into
the Life World
On the next point, we should be aware of the relation between the theoretical
world produced by scientists and applying the mechanisms in the theoretical
world to the life-world in order to change it. It is a popular understanding
that in Western philosophical tradition, the scientific worldview and its
applicability to the life-world are so closely linked as to be inseparable.
(Remember the relationship among God, Nature, and Human being.) Human
being alone is believed to have a right and capability to uncover and understand
the power governing Nature and control Nature by applying the resultant
knowledge to Nature itself. However, such philosophical tradition cannot
be shared among various peoples in the world; Or even the concepts, God,
Nature, and Human being, are so unique ones in Western philosophical tradition
and they are culture-dependent products.
Also, there is an interesting story on this issue (Ogawa, 1995a). Sano (1989) discusses that in 17th to 18th centuries in Europe, science (of course, there is no distinction between science and technology at that time.) was socially recognized as the 'usable' science, an ideology of 'practical science'; This means that 'usability of science' was based upon western value system. An ideology of 'science as an liberal art,' that is, epistemological value of science was newly invented by scientific community itself during 19th century when scientific community was eager to be involved in the university system at that time. This story suggests that science was originally recognized, not as the theoretical worldview, but as its usability and applicability. Thus, the inseparability of science and its applicability has a long history and thus, scientific community has been presupposing, that is, tacitly holding this inseparability, and still be difficult to realize that they are separable.
I argue, however, that they should be separated from each other, because
the idea of this inseparability comes only from the Western traditional
value system, which is an important factor of scientism. How to cope with,
or manage, the relation between science and its applicability and usability
should be determined by a kind of wisdom that is deeply linked to a value
system pervading the life-world setting of learners.
Scientism Found in Science Education Policy Documents
One of the representations of scientism, 'unconditional belief in science' is clearly found in recent documents on science education by scientific community and majority of science educators does agree with such statements without any doubt. For example, A Project 2061 Report, 'Science for all American,' (AAAS, 1989; p.12) writes as 'science education - meaning education in science, mathematics, and technology - should help students to develop the understandings and habits of mind they need to become compassionate human beings able to think for themselves and to face life head on.' International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) issued the Report on their programme on Capacity Building in Science in 1996. It writes that 'Indeed, the very habitability of the planet will depend on global popular consensus. As such, the spread of scientific culture, of scientific ways of thinking, and of knowledge is tied to the fate of humanity.' (ICSU Report, 1998; p.73)
On the second point, 'uncritical confidence of valuing application of science into life-world settings' is also found in many science education policy documents. For example, in the Project 2061 Report, Science for all American (AAAS, 1989) we can find the statements like;
Although many pressing global and local problems have technological origins, technology provides the tools for dealing with such problems, and the instruments for generating, through science, crucial new knowledge; without the continuous development and creative use of new technologies, society will limit its capability for survival and for working toward a world in which the human species is at peace with itself and its environment. (p.13)
Also, in the ICSU report mentioned above they writes 'To build capacity in science is to enable nations and regions to make use of science and technology for the well being and culture of their citizens. In a world whose questionable future is absolutely dependent on the advance of science and its wise application, the scientific illiteracy of the peoples of the world (and of so many of their leaders) present a universal crisis which transcends North-South, developing and developed, rich and poor.' (ICSU Report, 1998; pp.73-74)
Such types of scientism is also found as a guiding principle in major science education documents compiled by science educators. For example, National Science Education Standards (National Research Council, 1996) declares as follows;
All of us have a stake, as individuals and as a society, in scientific
literacy. An understanding of science makes it possible for everyone to
share in the richness and excitement of comprehending the natural world.
Scientific literacy enables people to use scientific principles and processes
in making personal decisions and to participate in discussions of scientific
issues that affect society. A sound grounding in science strengthens many
of the skills that people use every day, like solving problems creatively,
thinking critically, working cooperatively in teams, using technology effectively,
and valuing life-long learning. And economic productivity of our society
is tightly linked to the scientific and technological skills of our work
force. (ix)
The fact that such scientism is really found in the documents compiled
by science educators shows that they share the value of scientific community.
If so, scientism in science education contexts expresses itself unconsciously
by compelling learners (1) to believe in science, and (2) to be convinced
of the value of applying or using science into life-world settings. However,
these two points are not given a priori. They are strictly connected with
western value system. I have been arguing against this manifestation of
scientism (Ogawa,1995a; 1996; 1997a; 1997b). Of course, I do not want to
mention that it is wrong, but that it is one of the stances science educators
can take. What I want to argue is that science educators must decide whether
or not they share the value of scientific community before thinking of
science education policy issue in their respective contexts.
What is the Worth Teaching/Learning the Culture of Scientific Community?
How can we cope with scientism in science teaching settings? My opinion is that science educators should be more careful to be 'spokesman' or 'supporter' of scientific community, though I do not want to deny that scientists serve as science teachers in person, or vice versa. The public role of science teachers, especially in not-so-familiar-with-science-culture settings, should be to explain and teach various aspect of science, not from within the viewpoint of scientific community, but from the viewpoint of 'outsider' of scientific community. They do not necessarily force learners to believe in modern science. Therefore, science teachers should have broader perspectives on modern science than scientists do. From this point, the idea of 'cultural broker' Aikenhead (1996) proposes is worth re-examining more precisely.
Then, what is the value of modern science to teach or learn if modern science is regarded as the culture of scientific community?* One possible answer is because it is one of the important cultural heritage of the human beings. However, there is more important aspect. That is, 'culture of scientific community' as one of the mirrors to reflect learners' own 'science' (Ogawa*s usage) (Ogawa, 1995b).
A person living in a certain culture has her/his own personal science, but for her/him is it difficult to understand or be aware of the corresponding indigenous science as such directly. In general, one can understand or be aware of what something is alike or not alike by the process of comparing it with other things. In that process, we can use the others as the mirror for reflecting the target thing. As such, one needs mirrors to reflect indigenous science in order to get qualified information on indigenous science as well as on personal science. I think that indigenous sciences and personal sciences other than their own are possible mirrors. Furthermore, modern science is an excellent mirror for that use. The reverse is also true. We can get better understanding of modern science in comparison with indigenous science or personal science than we can do when modern science is set alone. This is the very positive value for laymen to be taught or learn modern science. It is through this comparative treatment of modern science, indigenous science, and personal science that 'science' education has its own value in a certain culture. In this sense, Jegede's collateral learning (Jegede, 1995), Ogunniyi's contiguity learning hypothesis (Ogunniyi, 1997), Aikenhead's anthropological learning (Aikenhead, 1997), and my multiscience perspective (Ogawa, 1995b) seem to be similar ideas, which are worth examining.
However, one thing must be mentioned. That is, each science is, in principle,
incommensurable. It is impossible for us to compare a component (say a
specific object, concept, or theory) in a certain science with an apparently
correspondent component in another science without considering the whole
system of each science. For example, what 'the sun' signifies or means
in a certain science is quite different from what 'the sun' signifies or
means in another science. 'The sun' in the first system has no habitat
in the second system of science, and vice versa. We should understand 'the
sun' with fully appreciating the relevant whole system of science. (see
Gough, 1998)
Postscript
My idea may give you an impression that I want to deny the value of modern science. This is a misunderstanding. Ultimate goal of my struggle is to find out wisdom to manage contemporary Japanese society, which is so much technologicalized and self-developing one (Ogawa, 1998a).
One of the major characteristics of the society is, as a Japanese philosopher Nakano (1988) suggests, that the society itself has a nature of autonomy and it develops as if it had its own will and it is beyond the control of the people living there. While people believe that they do produce and control such social systems as well as tools, machines, apparatus and so on, actually it is the social systems that control human mind as well as human behavior. Goods produced sometimes force us to use them (remember the case of portable cellular phone system in Japan). The technologicalized and self-developing society, as Nakano argues, can invade people's body and mind, and give significant effects to the subjectiveness like feelings, thought, intention, and affection in their deeper parts, and even in some cases, determine the subjectivity.
In such a society, modern science and science-driven technology are critical factors. Thus, I think one of most urgent social role of science educators must be to search for wisdom to manage modern science and science-driven technology. I have not yet found out such wisdom, but I continue to do so by surveying various kinds of wisdom appearing in our history and in indigenous wisdom in our present day. Modern science is of course one possible wisdom, but this does not mean we cannot find out another kind of wisdom in the future. One important point we should remind is that wisdom in almost every cultural setting had developed in its long history without any idea or awareness of 'finiteness of the earth.' Pursuit of new types of wisdom, which is based upon the 'finiteness of the earth' and manage modern science and science-driven technology, will be emergent need for science educators. Science educators should be always sensitive to another kind of wisdom than modern science. On the one hand, they should think of how to teach modern science, and on the other hand, they should also think of what is another kind of wisdom to manage contemporary technologicalized society.
Such struggle guides me to reexamine the fundamental issues in science
education. I am not so sure whether or not I am coming to my goal, but
I would invite colleagues to join my struggle.
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